Gallipoli 1915, Philip J. Haythornthwaite

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Gallipoli 1915, Philip J. Haythornthwaite

This Osprey covers the famous Gallipoli campaign in World War I, where British, Australian and New Zealand forces fought a bloody stalemate against the Turks in a hope of opening a second Front. This 96-page book is well illustrated with lots of photographs and colour drawings of aircraft, ships and the troops involved as well as 3 D maps of the battles. The text is very detailed and well researched with orders of battle and examples of the humour of the soldiers in such difficult conditions. The naval aspects of the campaign are also covered and a brief section covers war gamming the campaign, which is very good and includes some suggested rules.

Chapters
Origins of the Campaign
Commanders
Opposing Armies
The Naval Attack
The Landings
Battles of Krithia
Sari Bair
Sulva
Evacuation
The Battlefield Today
Further Reading
Wargamming

Author: Philip J. Haythornthwaite
Edition: Paperback
Pages: 96
Publisher: Osprey
Year: 2000

Gallipoli Campaign, 1915 (Dardenelles): Home

The amphibious assault against a defended beach is fully explored from the perspective of the defender.

The Encyclopedia of World War I by Spencer C. Tucker (Editor) John D. Eisenhower (Foreword by) Priscilla Mary Roberts (Editor)

Gallipoli 1915: frontal assault on Turkey by Philip J. Haythornthwaite

Failure to adapt - The British at Gallipoli, August 1915.

Rejecting accepted theories for unexpected military disasters, the authors brilliantly analyze disasters of great magnitude. They assert that military misfortune turns not on individual or collective failure but is rooted in the nature of the complex interconnections between men, systems, and organizations.

See part II: Dardanelles -- Gallipoli

"Between 1911 and 1923, a series of wars--chief among them World War I--would engulf the Ottoman Empire and its successor states. It is a story we think we know well, but as Sean McMeekin shows us in this revelatory new history, we know far less than we think. Drawing from his years of ground-breaking research in newly opened Ottoman and Russian archives, The Ottoman Endgame brings to light the entire strategic narrative that led to an unstable new order in postwar Middle East--much of which is still felt today"-- Jacket.

. 1. Beginning with the causes of the war and the invasion of Belgium in 1914 and carrying the history of the war to the close of 1915

See Ch. 12 Gallipoli / A. John Gallishaw.
Ch. 19 Gallipoli Abandoned / Gen. Sir Charles C. Monro.

Gallipoli, 1915: Frontal Assault on Turkey Paperback – Illustrated, 24 January 1991

This book, which is number eight in this Osprey series, gives a nice overview of the entire campaign. Most of it focuses on the battle, which is good. It does not have extraneous chapters on topics such as how to war game the battle. The author, Philip Haythornthwaite, has a writing style that includes minute details. For example, many of the units are identified at multiple levels (i.e.: by both their Brigade, then Division, etc.) Although this detail is informative, it can make the reading somewhat slow.

The campaign is primarily covered from the British and allied perspective. That said, the author gives some insight into the Turkish point of view. He also describes the difference in performance between the British and Turkish commanders. The Turkish commanders were clearly more aggressive and capable. The book ends with a short synopsis of the relevant personnel. Of note is that the Turkish commander, Mustafa Kemal, eventually became Kemal Ataturk, the founding father of modern Turkey.

The book has numerous black and white photos. There are also drawings of ships, planes, and uniforms that add to the narrative. It has five 2D battle maps. They are uncluttered, clear and do a very good job of complimenting what can be a somewhat confusing narrative. There are also three 3D bird's eye view maps which are pretty good.
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Bottom line: the writing style can be slightly tedious. That said, this book is full of details, photos, and drawings. Essentially, this book provides a succinct, albeit detailed, overview of the campaign.

What used to be called the Great War (before we knew enough to start numbering them) hasn't gotten a lot of play since perhaps the mid-1930s. Not nearly as much as the American Civil War, the Napoleonic Wars, or World War II. And when the subject does arise, it's usually with regard to the Somme, or Ypres, or Verdun. But the year the Allies spent gnawing away at the Turks on the Gallipoli Peninsula had the potential to change the entire war. The concept, in fact, for the campaign was well thought out. It was the execution that was disastrous.

Europe had been expecting the tottering Ottoman Empire to collapse for more than a generation. The last couple of sultans had been appalling people and the "Young Turks" had taken control, but they were no improvement. Enver Pasha, the half-Albanian war minister, especially, was an egotistical loose cannon, cordially hated by most of the country's population. The problem was, Turkey's geopolitical position was crucial, sitting astride the only passage in and out of the Black Sea, which meant the majority of Russia's imports and exports couldn't move without Turkish permission. And Russia being one of the Allies, Britain and France were hoping the Czar could ease the trench-warfare deadlock on the Western Front by opening a second front in the east -- not unlike the situation in World War II, actually. But to deliver the military supplies Russia needed to carry out that hope, the Allies would have to open up the Dardanelles to shipping.

It looked to be an easy thing to accomplish: Launch a naval attack on the haphazard Turkish defenses, follow that up with a series of landings by infantry divisions against the pathetic Turkish army, and it's all over in a matter of weeks, right? Had the planning been accelerated (cutting short Germany's efforts to train and equip the Turks), and had the Allies appointed talented and forceful military leaders to run the campaign, and had the Royal Navy been willing to supply anything but a handful of antiquated warships, the whole thing might indeed have been completed successfully in a relatively short time. Instead, the initial naval operations early in 1915 ran into unexpected Turkish minefields and several battleships sank with all their crews in a matter of minutes. The landings that followed ran into strong opposition from Turkish troops who, though poorly equipped, were tenacious fighters. And the whole Allied advance ground down to another deadlock, not that different from the situation in France. The British leadership, both naval and military, was astonishingly incompetent. The ANZAC troops from Australia and New Zealand -- lacking experience but arguably the best natural fighting men on the Allied side -- were wasted time and again in ill-conceived actions. And finally, the Allied forces had to be withdrawn entirely the mostly secret retreat was carried out with far more success than any of the preceding assaults.

The author is a first-rate military historian who specializes in the 19th and early 20th centuries and his narrative of the campaign is masterful. He nails the personalities of the political and military leaders on both sides, explains the strategy, and describes clearly what worked and what didn't and why. As one would expect from Osprey, there are many useful photographs and paintings of battlefields, trenches, weapons, equipment, and ships, and also some excellent maps. I strongly recommend this volume as a cure for the prevailing ignorance in our time regarding the first "modern" war.

भारत से शीर्ष राय

अन्य देशों से शीर्ष राय

The 96-page Osprey Campaign series supplies some superb overviews/introductions to military campaigns. Philip Haythornthwaite's "Gallipoli 1915" provides a clear account of the Gallipoli campaign, with a straightforward chronology, clear and colourful maps, plenty of photographs and uniform details, and some very useful clear information on the orders of battle for the various phases of the campaign.

If one was to be picky, Haythornthwaite is somewhat out of date when he states that ". the appalling mismanagement which occurred should not obscure the essential feasibility of the concept" most recent scholarship now tends towards the view that it was fundamentally flawed, was never going to succeed, and in any case stood little chance of shortening the war. However, this apart, this book gives a basic and sound grounding, and is a really good starting point for someone wanting to learn about Gallipoli. To explore the topic in depth, it can then be followed by reading a longer and more detailed history, such as Robin Prior's "Gallipoli the End of the Myth" (a wonderful book which reflects current academic thinking on the campaign), although you will still find yourself constantly referring back to this Osprey book for those maps and photos.

Haythornthwaite, Philip J. Gallipoli 1915.

(Modern Campaigns series, 5). London: Osprey Publishing Co, 1991.

What used to be called the Great War (before we knew enough to start numbering them) hasn’t gotten a lot of play since perhaps the mid-1930s. Not nearly as much as the American Civil War, the Napoleonic Wars, or World War II. And when the subject does arise, it’s usually with regard to the Somme, or Ypres, or Verdun, all on the Western Front. But the year the Allies spent gnawing away at the Turks on the Gallipoli Peninsula had the potential to change the entire war. The concept for the campaign was, in fact, well thought out. It was the execution that was disastrous.

Europe had been expecting the tottering Ottoman Empire to collapse for more than a generation. The last couple of sultans had been appalling people and the “Young Turks” had taken control, but they were no improvement. Enver Pasha, the half-Albanian war minister, especially, was an egotistical loose cannon, cordially hated by most of the country’s population. The problem was, Turkey’s geopolitical position was crucial, sitting astride the only passage in and out of the Black Sea, which meant the majority of Russia’s imports and exports couldn’t move without Turkish permission. And Russia being one of the Allies, Britain and France were hoping the Czar could ease the trench-warfare deadlock on the Western Front by opening a second front in the east — not unlike the later situation in World War II, actually. But to deliver the military supplies Russia needed to carry out that hope, the Allies would have to open up the Dardanelles to shipping.

It looked to be an easy thing to accomplish: Launch a naval attack on the haphazard Turkish defenses, follow that up with a series of landings by infantry divisions against the pathetic Turkish army, and it’s all over in a matter of weeks, right? Had the planning been accelerated (cutting short Germany’s efforts to train and equip the Turks), and had the Allies appointed talented and forceful military leaders to run the campaign, and had the Royal Navy been willing to supply anything better than a handful of antiquated warships, the whole thing might indeed have been completed successfully in a relatively short time. And it would have been a different sort of war. Instead, the initial naval operations early in 1915 ran into unexpected Turkish minefields and several under-armored battleships sank with all their crews in a matter of minutes. The amphibious landings that followed ran into strong opposition from Turkish troops who, though poorly equipped, were tenacious fighters. And the whole Allied advance ground down to another deadlock, not that different from the trench-warfare situation in France. The British leadership, both naval and military, was astonishingly incompetent. The ANZAC troops from Australia and New Zealand — lacking experience but arguably the best natural fighting men on the Allied side — were wasted time and again in ill-conceived offensive actions. And finally, the Allied forces had to be withdrawn entirely the mostly secret retreat was carried out with far more success than any of the preceding assaults.

The author is a first-rate military historian who specializes in the 19th and early 20th centuries and his narrative of the campaign is masterful. He nails the personalities of the political and military leaders on both sides, explains the intended strategy, and describes clearly what worked and what didn’t and why. As one would expect from Osprey, there are many useful photographs and paintings of battlefields, trenches, weapons, equipment, and ships, and also some excellent maps. I strongly recommend this volume as a cure for the prevailing ignorance in our time regarding the first “modern” war.

Gallipoli, 1915: Frontal Assault on Turkey (Osprey Military Campaign)

The Gallipoli expedition of 1915, the brainchild of Winston Churchill, was designed to knock the Turkish Empire out of the First World War and open a supply route to Russia. The campaign is characterised by the military incompetence of the higher commands, particularly the Allies. However, in spite of this, Gallipoli deserves to be, and is, also remembered for the heroism and resourcefulness of both the British army and the men of the Australian and New Zealand Army Corps. This book details the battles, hardships and eventual evacuation that these men had to go through, in this comprehensive guide to the Gallipoli landings of World War I (1914-1918).

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Gallipoli – What Went Wrong?

We take a look at the key mistakes made during the Gallipoli campaign.

Experiencing Life As A Soldier In Gallipoli

So said the fictional Sergeant Horvath and Captain Miller after the slaughter on Omaha Beach in ‘Saving Private Ryan’.

As gripping and realistic as this scene is, Churchill later said that the casualties on D-Day had been lighter than he had expected.

That might have been because of another amphibious operation 29 years earlier that had been his brainchild, and that, unlike D-Day, had also been an unmitigated disaster.

Just as the D-Day landings (Operation Neptune) were the preliminary stage of the Battle of Normandy (Operation Overlord), the Gallipoli assault that began on April 25, 1915 was intended as the initial stage of a larger naval campaign.

A quick look at the map reveals the strategic logic behind the assault.

Britain and France were fighting Germany on the Western Front while Russia was locked into combat along its vast borders with Germany, Austria-Hungary and Turkey simultaneously.

However, Churchill believed, with good reason, that geography could work in the Allies favour instead.

Turkey is uniquely placed in that it is situated in both Asia and Europe simultaneously. This is because the Dardanelles strait cuts off the top corner of Turkey (where it is connected to Europe) and links the Mediterranean with the Black Sea.

While ‘Lawrence of Arabia’ would work with Arab allies to attack Turkey (the Ottoman Empire at the time) from its Asian side, an assault in the Dardanelles presented the tantalising prospect of knocking the Ottomans out of the war immediately.

That’s because Turkey’s capital, Constantinople (now Istanbul), lay on the Dardanelles. If it could be pounded into submission by Britain’s mighty navy, there was every reason to believe capitulation would follow.

As a bonus, there would then be a warm-water route open to Russia allowing her to be resupplied by Britain year-round (northern routes to Russia were prohibitively cold during the winter).

As First Lord of the Admiralty, it was well within Churchill’s remit to propose such a strategy and the operation was first launched in February and March of 1915. At this point, it was conducted by the Navy alone.

But mines within the straits and shelling from coastal forts made getting through impossible.

This necessitated the landing of troops on the Gallipoli peninsula, the northern bank of the Dardanelles and offshoot of Turkey’s European corner.

The intention was for these men to rapidly work their way inland where they would promptly overwhelm and capture the forts and thus permit the Navy to slip through.

But while this all made good strategic sense, tactically the geography of Gallipoli would be as much of an enemy to the attacking troops as the defending Ottomans.

In the Discovery Channel’s ‘The Battle of Gallipoli’, geologist and amateur historian Professor Peter Doyle states:

“There wasn’t just one enemy… the British and the Allies were fighting not only the Turks, they were fighting the terrain. The terrain was an enemy that they had to fight and it was probably on unequal terms.”

In other words, the jagged hills and cliffs that zigzagged the peninsula were a defender’s dream and an attacker’s nightmare.

Thus, considered on this scale, the answer to the question of what went wrong at Gallipoli is pretty much everything, because the operation seems to have been doomed from the outset.

Proper reconnaissance was never carried out, largely because good aerial photography would be years in the future.

Professor Doyle points out that information that was gathered from the air was supplemented with sketches of the landing sites made from the water.

These did show defended positions, the wire, where the forts were located and basic terrain. But crucially, the location of machine-guns and reverse-slope trenches and gun emplacements were missing. These elements were meant to remain hidden, of course, and unfortunately for the attackers, there was no way to detect them before they were encountered.

When 11,000 men did land on April 25th, there were plenty of traps waiting for them.

The ANZACs (Australian and New Zealand troops) came ashore in the north (at Z Beach) and their objective was a rise known as Mal Tepe far inland.

The British, meanwhile, were meant to land at multiple locations around the toe of the peninsula (at S, V, W, X and Y Beaches) and their objective was Achi Baba.

The plan was to seize the high ground, assault positions along ‘the narrows’ (the Dardanelles’ slimmest point) and then disable the defenders’ guns so that the Royal Navy could wind their way through.

On W Beach, the Lancashire Fusiliers who attacked were immediately hemmed in by the low cliffs. Naturally, the Turks had built their trenches along the contours of these cliffs since the terrain naturally funnelled attackers into a deadly V hemmed by rifles and machine-guns.

The Lancashire Fusiliers didn’t stand a chance.

Worse, although they had come ashore expecting to run into barbed wire, the British at W beach hadn’t expected the wire to be so robust that their wire cutters would not be able to slice through.

The assault on V Beach was similarly tragic.

Here, a more ambitious landing was being attempted, with men in row boats as well as an old collier named the SS River Clyde, from which men were meant to disembark down gangplanks onto the beach.

Boats were peppered with lethal fire, and those coming down the gangplanks would be funnelled, disastrously, into right where the enemy fire was at its most intense.

Half of them became casualties before even getting to shore, though once there a low bank granted a reprieve as men were able to huddle behind and beneath it after digging in with their spades.

The story was similarly dire on other beaches, but while getting ashore was a major achievement in and of itself, the difficulties didn’t let up for the attackers once they’d done so.

They would next discover that their maps were inaccurate. Entire hills were missing, as was vital input on enemy wire and positions.

The disparity was worst for the ANZACs, who had landed at the wrong place. The men made the best of it and rushed into the hills. But, after navigating their way through a deadly thicket of Turkish sharp shooters sniping at them from beneath the undergrowth, the Aussie and Kiwi troops made a jaw-dropping discovery.

They were expecting a gentle rise that would allow fast passage to the high ground that was their objective further inland. However, when they crested the first peak they discovered to their horror that their cartography had been woefully inadequate.

The hill fell away in front of them into an intimidating series of jagged rises and crevices – an area that would be murderous to cross.

The Allies had been pinned down, all 70,000 of them. Now the Gallipoli peninsula would become a microcosm of the Western Front – namely a quagmire.

Ironically, the whole operation had been intended to bypass the stalemate that had developed elsewhere, not imitate it. The fact that it had now done so would bring other planning problems to the surface.

Getting supplies in would be a logistical nightmare. Reaching the men was difficult precisely because the peninsula remained defended and many boats that approached it were sunk.

Small details like lack of standardisation in the type of ammunition used by the British Army and Royal Navy often meant that bullets kept by the latter could not be utilised by the former.

Meanwhile, the heights continued to facilitate the harassment of those on the peninsula by artillery as these positions had been neither defined nor quickly captured on the first day.

The result was lethal shrapnel raining down constantly, forcing the men below ground.

The confinement of trenches and tunnels then exacerbated the spread of disease – after all, once the initial assault had failed, the warm climate, human waste, and hordes of closely packed soldiers would be a perfect breeding ground for microbes.

Dysentery, a type of gastroenteritis complete with bloody stools (the result of the triggering pathogen eating into the intestinal lining), was probably the worst illness. A 12-stone man could drop to eight within several weeks of being infected.

As the spring turned to summer and the temperature soared, and more and more men became dehydrated through diarrhoea, lack of water became another enemy.

According to Colonel Alan Hawley, Commander of 3 Division Medical Services, 20 litres of water a day is necessary to sustain a man in hot weather. Soldiers at Gallipoli would have been lucky to have got two a day.

This is because wells were spoiled by sea water contamination, necessitating the hauling of huge canisters of fresh water sometimes brought from as far away as Egypt.

Despite these difficulties the Allies doggedly pressed on, making numerous assaults, but they were to hit another wall – and his name was Mustafa Kemal.

He would go on to serve as the first president of Turkey in 1923 after the end of the Ottoman Empire, but during the Gallipoli campaign, he was the Turks’ frontline commander.

He was astute and ruthless, telling his men when they were on the verge of retreating: “I don’t order you to attack, I order you to die”.

The Battle For Gallipoli

Despite being vastly outnumbered, the Turks were able, through Kemal’s thorough planning and tough leadership, to make the most of their natural defences and eventually repel the invaders.

The British were eventually forced to retire in early 1916 with nothing to show for their efforts at Gallipoli during much of 1915. Churchill would resign over the fiasco.

To learn more about Gallipoli, read 'Gallipoli 1915' by Philip Haythornthwaite, 'ANZAC Infantryman 1914–15' by Ian Sumner, 'Ottoman Infantryman 1914-18' by David Nicolle and visit Osprey Publishing for more military history.